The Flyers are All In, Even if you Did Not Notice
In what has been a tumultuous 12 months, the Flyers front office and the brain trust at Comcast, decided Philadelphia was a legitimate cup contenders and have systematically bet it all. April 12, 2021 was the day the Flyers and the front office admitted as much by decisions made on that day.
The covid ravaged season was winding down, with the team clinging to the slightest of playoff hopes. A Fool’s hope. The trade deadline loomed and the Flyers had to make a decision. Was this team close to cup contention, being a player or two away from having a shot at lord Stanley’s silver? Or was this team, with a good farm system and youth on the roster, primed for a complete rebuild?
That April the Flyers gave away Michael Raffl for a fifth-round pick, and, mercifully, ended the Erik Gustafsson experience for a seventh-round pick. But these were no brainer housekeeping decisions, not a set up for a rebuild. Raffl, then thirty-two and with an expiring contract, was clearly not in the team’s long-term plans. Removing Gustafsson, with a contract ending soon, remedied a mistake the front office wished to distance themselves from as soon as possible.
The key decision focused on another soon to be unrestricted free agent who would be at the top of a cup contenders wish list, Scott Laughton. Rather than trading him, the front office decided to sign Laughton to a five-year, $15 million contract. On its face, there is nothing wrong with the contract, $3 million a season, it seems a fair value. The length of the contract could be problematic to trade, however, it captures Laughton’s prime years keeping him under contract until he is 31.
Reasonable people can disagree on the wisdom of Laughton’s extension, but rather than argue the merits of Laughton as a player, it is more important to understand the deal in terms of strategy, what it signaled and its long-term implications. It was a big deal, it was the day the Flyers committed to the core they had, a core they thought could go to the cup or one that would break them whilst trying.
While I don’t have incriminating Comcast texts or Chuck Fletcher’s laptop, the evidence of the mind set was made stunningly clear by their actions. Would any reasonable general manager keep Laughton if he suspected the team was going to be just as bad the next season? Laughton, as a soon to be UFA, could have re-signed with the Flyers after a trade. The fact that Laughton was even offered a contract is an admission that the best minds at Comcast were convinced the Flyers would be better in 2021-2022.
Laughton will never be more valuable as a trade chip than he was at the 2021 deadline. He had a year remaining on a contract worth just below 2 million a year. General Manager Chuck Fletcher had admitted he was listening to offers for Laughton, meaning there was a market.
It would be fair to reason, that just by playing the percentages, the fact that only two teams make the cup finals, the team would likely be better moving Laughton, clearing the space and getting some assets they could repurpose if they did make a cup run. It was a make or break move, for a nice, but not invaluable, player. The signing took away organizational flexibility, it is the type that is made by a front office that is certain it can contend, or one that is desperate.
This should have been the first clue that the crew at Comcast, and Chuck Fletcher were going to play this hand. Laughton is not a make or break player, and this contract in the grand scheme is not make or break either. But it was the start of the Flyers boxing themselves in. In Texas Hold’em terms, signing Laughton was matching the big blind. Paying to stay in the hand because it has a chance to lay out. Did this group of players represent a pair of threes, or pocket aces as the hole card?
The summer, even with the Laughton signing, still left the Flyers opportunity to fold, to stop the fool’s errand and look to the future and dismantle the core, effectively, to wait for better cards. The team had reasonable amounts of cap space and was still flush with young talent, including Provorov, Sanheim, Myers, Farabee, Konecny, Patrick, Aube-Kubel, Allison, and Morgan Frost. That all changed when the Flyers traded Myers and Patrick to Nashville for Ryan Ellis.
Patrick was an unrestricted free agent and had not impressed during his time in Philadelphia. Myers, a right-handed defensemen, had been uneven, but more good than bad, and was under contract until 2023 at $2.55 million AAV. By contrast Ellis, then 30, was signed until 2027 with a $6.25 million AAV. Like the trade or not, the Flyers took two assets, with reasonable contracts, that could easily be traded, for a long-term contract that will be difficult to move. Ellis, like Laughton, would be much easier to trade with a year or two left on the contract. Trading for Ellis represented at least a four-year commitment by the team. By trading for Ellis, the Flyers effectively paid to see the cards on the flop and were starting to commit to a new core that included Laughton and Ellis.
The Flyers shake up continued, swapping Jakub Voracek for Cam Atkinson, which seemed to be more about fit, changing the core by removing Voracek, but not gaining much in the way of flexibility. As a stand-alone move, perhaps this could be seen as a hint of rebuilding, but in the context of the prior trades and what was to come, the Atkinson trade does not resemble anything close to a rebuild, but a fine tuning for an apparent cup run.
Fletcher continued to up the ante and sent Robert Hagg to Buffalo in exchange for Rasmus Ristolainen, a deal that was widely panned as a criminal overpayment by the Flyers. The Flyers spent both a first and a second-round pick in addition to Hagg for the big Fin.
Hagg and Ristolainen are similar players in the roles they are expected to play, that of the physical defensive defensemen. Ristolainen is right-handed and may have a higher offensive upside than Hagg, but he is a -163 +/- over his career including a -18 last year. Hagg is a career +12. Hagg has a career corsi of 45.7%, topping 53 percent last season, while Ristolainen has a career corsi of 44.7%, 43.9% last season. Like the Atkinson deal, this trade had little impact In terms of contract ramifications, but the outrageous price that Fletcher paid to land Ristolainen screams “Win Now, We are All In”.
The final wager was the Couturier extension. Like in the cases of Laughton, Ellis or Atkinson, there is not much point in arguing if the contract was fair or too generous, the issue is it will be difficult to trade. Couturier, whose old contract was set to expire at the end of 2022, is now part of a core that includes Atkinson, Laughton, Ellis, Hayes, Farabee and Provorov. A core that is under contract for the next half decade. Instead of signing Couts, now 29, for the next eight seasons, he may have been much more valuable as a trade chip at this season’s trade deadline.
Looking back from today to when the Flyers signed Laughton, it seems Comcast and Fletcher have charted a disastrous path for the franchise. The team is not appreciably better. Laughton and Couts are still solid. Ellis and Hayes have struggled with injuries, it is worth noting players generally don’t get less injury prone as they age. Atkinson and Ristolainen are arguably upgrades, but not enough to make the Flyers cup favorites.
It seems clear it would have been better to pass on Ellis, trade Laughton, and to tee up Couturier and Giroux at this season’s trade deadline. The team should have kept Hagg, and the two picks. Same with Gostisbehere, and the two picks sent with him to Arizona for some cap space. FYI Ghost is third on the team in points and is playing over 20 minutes a night. It is better to have no chance at the cup with cap flexibility and picks, rather than the mediocre, cap maxed team today with little hope in the future.
The Flyers purposely made the choice to forgo the opportunity for a complete rebuild, where there was the potential to build on youth and exchange pieces of the core for a better tomorrow. Instead, the organization is saddled with a group of players who have yet to show a consistent compete level, or enough skill to be consistent winners. This with a core made up of players with several hard to move, long term contracts that run well after the players’ primes.
The Flyers are not completely cornered, at least not technically. JVR is in the last two years of his contract. But he is something of a specialist, great talent with some ugly flaws. The Flyers would need a desperate contender who needed JVR’s specific skills. This may be hard to find.
Ristolainen’s contract expires after this season. It is possible that he could be moved at the deadline, but it is unlikely they will get anything close to what they paid for him. The team could choose not to re-sign Ristolainen, but that would paint an already questionable deal in an even more unflattering light.
Last but not least, Claude Giroux is in the final year of his contract. Trading Giroux would, or should rather, net a nice haul, but trading away a franchise icon is a risky public relations move. The Flyers have already fired a few coaches and it is not hard to imagine trading Giroux may cost someone else their job.
I have not yet been able to prove who in the organization made the big bet. My guess is the bet was made “by consensus”, cause that is always right, before Fletcher was hired by the corporate Comcast bosses. It was likely done shortly before Ron Hextall was fired, with his patient approach the antithesis to the “all in” mess we see today. Comcast rushed the rebuild, which likely needed a couple of more years to mature before the big gamble. Comcast hired the guy who would do what they wanted, Fletcher, and implemented their plan. In the process left the fan base with, to date, a mediocre team, little cap space and with no outs, at least for the next few seasons.